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Recent Developments 
Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd.: 
Accident Victim's Estate May Recover Damages for Pre-Impact Fright if a Jury is 
Capable of Making an Objective Determination that the Victim Experienced 
Anguish and Distress Before Impending Death 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland addressed whether the 
estate of an accident victim may be 
awarded damages in a survival action 
when the victim, who died immediately 
upon impact, experienced pre-impact 
fright. Beynon v. Montgomery 
Cablevision Ltd. , 351 Md. 460, 718 
A.2d 1161 (1998). The court held 
that when a decedent experiences 
great anxiety and fear of imminent 
death immediately prior to the fatal 
physical impact, the decedent's estate 
may recover for emotional distress and 
mental anguish that can be measured 
by an objective determination. 
In the early morning of June 8, 
1990, Montgomery Cablevision 
Limited Partnership was installing 
replacement cable on Interstate 495 
("capital beltway"). Beynon, 351 
Md. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163. 
Montgomery Cable coordinated with 
the Maryland State Police to have 
traffic on the capital beltway stopped 
during the cable replacement. Id. 
During the repair, traffic backed up 
one mile on both sides of the capital 
beltway. Id. James P. Kirkland 
("Kirkland") was at the end of the 
traffic congestion in his tractor-trailer. 
!d. Kirkland testified that his trailer 
was stopped in a middle lane, and that 
there was traffic on both sides of him. 
Id. 
At the same time, Douglas K. 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 44 
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Beynon ("Beynon") was traveling at 
55 m.p.h. in the same direction as 
Kirkland. Id. at 464-65, 718 A.2d 
at 1163. Beynon was approximately 
192 feet behind Kirkland's tractor-
trailer when he realized he was going 
to crash. Id. at 465, 718 A.2d at 
1163. Beynon slammed on his brakes 
and veered to the right. Id. However, 
Beynon was unable to stop his vehicle, 
hit the rear of Kirkland' s trailer, and 
was killed on impact. Id. 
In the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, Beynon's 
parents contended that Beynon 
suffered and should be compensated 
for pre-impact fright, which was 
defined as "the mental anguish the 
decedent suffered from the time he 
became aware of the impending crash 
until the collision." Id. at 465, 718 
A.2d at 1164. Beynon's parents 
presented the seventy -one and a half 
feet of skid marks to prove that 
Beynon reacted to the imminent 
danger of crashing. Id. at 465, 718 
A.2d at 1163. The trial court agreed 
that the parents presented sufficient 
evidence of pre-impact fright and 
instructed the jury that it could make 
an award for pain, suffering, and 
mental anguish. !d. at 465-66, 718 
A.2d at 1164. The jury returned a 
verdict for the petitioners, and 
awarded $1 ,000,000.00 to Beynon's 
estate for pre-impact fright. Id. at 
466, 718 A.2d at 1164. The court 
reduced the award to $350,000 
pursuant to section 11-1 08(b) of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland. Id. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
judgment for post-impact fright, 
concluding that a cause of action 
based only on fright cannot stand 
without physical injury to the victim 
or an injury capable of objective 
determination. Id. at 467-69, 718 
A.2d at 1164-65 (citing 
Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. v. 
Beynon, 116 Md. App. 363, 388, 
696 A.2d 491, 503 (1997)). The 
intermediate appellate court stated 
that damages for pre-impact fright 
cannot be awarded when a victim 
dies on impact or never regains 
consciousness. Id. at 469, 718 A.3d 
at 1165 (citing Montgomery 
Cablevision Ltd., 116 Md. App. at 
388,696 A.2d at 503). The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari, reversed the court of 
special appeals and remanded the 
case with instructions to reinstate the 
trial court's judgment. Id. at 509,718 
A.2d at 1185. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by reviewing case law from 
jurisdictions that allow the recovery 
of pre-impact fright damages and 
jurisdictions that do not allow such 
damages. !d. at 476-97, 718 A.2d 
at 1169-79. Following this review, 
the court determined that the cases 
upholding an award of damages for 
pre-impact fright were more 
persuasive and compatible with 
Marylandlaw. Id. at 497, 718 A.2d 
at 1179. 
The court next summarized 
Maryland law involving issues 
regarding recovery for emotional 
injury. Id. at 497 -504, 718 A.2d at 
1179-83. The court concluded that 
damages for emotional distress are 
recoverable in Maryland under two 
circumstances. Id. at 504-05, 718 
A.2d at 1183. First, damages are 
recoverable when the emotional 
distress is proximately caused by the 
defendant's wrongful act and results 
in a physical injury. Id. (citing Green 
v. TA. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 
69, 77, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909». 
Second, damages are recoverable 
when the emotional distress is capable 
of being determined in an objective 
manner. Id. (citing Vance v. Vance, 
286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 
733 (1979». Significantly, the court 
noted that this standard for recovery 
of damages for emotional distress 
chronologically varies the common 
law chain of events - wrongful fact, 
physical impact, physical injury and 
then emotional distress, for such 
recovery. !d. at 505, 718 A.2d at 
1183. Thus, the court introduced a 
more flexible and accommodating 
sequence of events for recovery of 
emotional damages. Id. The court 
concluded, given the new 
accommodating sequence of events, 
that the compensability of pre-impact 
fright is permissible "when it is the 
proximate result of a wrongful act and 
it produces a physical injury or is 
manifested in some objective form." 
Id. 
Physical injury, the court 
stressed, provides the objective 
manifestation of the emotional injury 
and serves "as the yardstick by which 
a tort victim's emotional harm may be 
measured." Id.at507, 718A.2dat 
1184. In the present case, the court 
explained, Beynon's fright was 
accompanied by physical injuries, the 
injuries that caused his death. Id. The 
court also stated that Beynon's fright 
was also accompanied by an 
independent objective manifestation 
of emotional distress and mental 
anguish. Id. The court concluded 
that Beynon's fright was capable of 
objective determination by the 
seventy-one and a half feet of skid 
marks that resulted from his 
apprehension of impending death. Id. 
Again discussing the sequence· 
of events and proximate cause of 
harm, the court stressed that the fact 
that Beynon's fright occurred before 
the crash that resulted in his fatal 
injuries did not affect causation. Id. 
A wrongful act need only proximately 
cause mental anguish, and this mental 
disturbance does not need to be the 
result of physical injury. Id. Thus, 
the court opined, the respondent was 
responsible for the emotional 
disturbance Beynon experienced due 
to the crash. Id. 
In addition, the court reasoned 
that considering the purpose of 
survival statutes is to permit a 
decedent's estate to bring an action 
that the decedent would have brought 
had he lived, refusing to allow 
Beynon's estate to recover pre-impact 
fright damages in this survival action 
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would be illogical. Id. at 508, 718 
A.2dat 1185. HadBeynonlived,he 
no doubt would have been permitted 
to recover damages for the pre-
impact fright he suffered before hitting 
the tractor-trailer. Id. 
The court next addressed the 
issue of permitting a jury to determine 
pre-impact fright. Id. The court 
concluded that the jury determination 
required the jury to use the same 
reasoning and common knowledge it 
would be permitted to use if it were 
determining non-economic damages 
such as pain and suffering. Id. 
Furthermore, the court explained that 
the jury only needs evidence from 
which they could reasonably infer that 
the decedent experienced fright. !d. 
The court opined that in the present 
case, the jury could have reasonably 
inferred from the seventy-one and a 
half foot skid marks that Beynon was 
aware of the impending crash and 
tried to avoid it. Id. 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Wilner disagreed with the majority 
determination that the existence of 
fright could be measured by seventy-
one and a half feet of skid marks. Id. 
at 509-10, 718 A.2d at 1185-86. 
Judge Wilner stated that the case 
lacked any substantial evidence from 
which a jury could infer that Beynon 
was consciously experiencing fright 
while trying to stop his vehicle. Id. at 
511,718 A.2d at 1186. According 
to Judge Wilner, it was "rank 
speculation" for a jury to conclude that 
Beynon was consciously thinking 
about anything other than trying to 
avoid hitting the trailer. Id. Judge 
Wilner also expressed great concern 
over the amount per second of 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 45 
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damages awarded in the case, which 
was $140,000 per second of fright. 
Id. at 512, 718 A.2d at 1187. 
Significantly, in Beynon v. 
Montgomery Cablevision Ltd, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recognized an action for pre-impact 
fright when the impact causes 
instantaneous death. As a result of 
this decision, when a plaintiff offers 
evidence that provides an objective 
determination of the distress suffered 
by the decedent, his or her estate may 
recover for the suffering. The court's 
holding permits juries to infer the 
decedent's fright from the evidence 
presented. The effect of this case will 
add to the unchecked speculation and 
conjecture in Maryland'sjury rooms. 
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